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Abstract.  I emphasize two merits of Watkins’ account in Kant on Laws: the strong 
evidential support it has, and the central place it gives to Kant’s laws of mechanics. 
Then, I raise two questions for further research. 1. What kind of evidential rea-
soning confirms a Kantian law? 2. Do natures explain Kantian laws? If so, how?  
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Anyone interested in Kant should be thankful for Eric Watkins’ study; it is 
monumental, deep, and far sighted.1 It took the author well over two dec-
ades of reflection to probe the issue completely, which goes to show just 
how difficult its associated problems are. Here I seek to praise it twice, and 
then to end with two questions. In an older sense, a critical engagement 
was expected to uncover merit too, not just reasons to quibble. I pay hom-




Suppose that exegeses of philosophical doctrines count as knowledge 
claims. Then we may ask, legitimately, what counts as evidence for them? 
                                                
1 Numbers in parentheses denote page numbers in E. WATKINS, Kant on Laws, Oxford 
University Press, 2019.  
 
 
Any exegesis is a third-order discourse, and so empirical facts cannot di-
rectly confirm it.2 Still, there must be warrant for it of some sort. I submit 
that Watkins’ account does have the warrant to support it, and it is eviden-
tially superior to its rivals, in three respects: his evidence is of better quality; 
it comes from a broader range of sources; and his local construals are con-
silient. I elaborate on these virtues next.  
 Watkins’ evidence is superior in scope, diachronic and systematic. 
Historically, it feeds on a century of European accounts of law, from the 
later Leibniz to about 1800. Synchronically, it draws on Kantian doctrines 
ranging from the Analogies of Experience to the metaphysics of political 
legislation. In both quantity and reach, that exceeds by an order of magni-
tude the textual basis of rival interpretations.  
 Qualitatively as well, his basis is better. A good number of recent 
exegeses rely heavily on his undergraduate lectures on metaphysics. The 
main problem is that, so far, we lack any scholarly consensus on the real 
evidential force of those lectures. Consider some reasons for concern. We 
do not know how reliable they are qua record of his genuine views on the 
topic. We have no agreed-upon criteria for deciding which view takes prec-
edence when his classroom pronouncements are at odds with his published 
words. And, we have no good analysis of which views in those lectures 
were stable, which ones changed, and why.3 To compound our predica-
ment, those views are often just stated: instances of ipse dixit, unaccompa-
nied by careful argument. In light of these shortcomings, student notes 
from Kant’s lectures should count as weak evidence for his considered 
views on important matters. Thus, an interpretation that avoids crucial re-
liance on them is, ceteris paribus, preferable to ones that do require them 
indispensably. Kant on Laws is in that fortunate position. Ergo, it is eviden-
tially superior to its rivals.  
                                                
2 Laws of nature are first-order statements (about facts); philosophies of science are se-
cond-order sentences (about laws); and interpretations are third-order discourse (about 
second-order sentences).  
3 To be sure, a first step in the right direction is C. FUGATE, Kant’s Lectures on Metaphys-
ics: A Critical Guide, Cambridge University Press, 2019. But, we are a long way from a 
stable consensus on those lectures.  
 
 
 Even more valuably, Watkins’ case is consilient. That is, each local 
account (of specific kinds of laws in Kant, e.g. transcendental, metaphysi-
cal, or practical) supports his genus account of lawhood, and integrates ex-
planatorily with the other local accounts. That makes them consilient—a 
feature with evidential import. Consilience is a source of confirmation in 
knowledge domains where deductive proof and inductive generalization do 
not easily reach.  
 Just how valuable Watkins’ result is emerges if we step back from 
it to enlarge the perspective. Kant was not the only early modern who 
sought to embed laws in his theoretical and practical philosophy alike. 
Hobbes, Leibniz, and Locke did too, as did Malebranche. But, they run the 
risk of unifying on the cheap—by equivocating on ‘law.’ Specifically, the 
danger is of letting ‘law of nature’ denote any universal pattern of dead-
matter behavior, in their theoretical philosophy; and having it denote a cer-
tain type of injunction on rational agents, in their practical doctrine. Such 
unifications are easy but hollow, because the two senses above have nothing 
in common, and so there is no one concept of law to theorize about; there 
is just one linguistic vehicle (law, Gesetz, loi, or lex naturae) deceptively 
used to convey two distinct ideas. Really, any thinker with a natural philos-
ophy will run into this problem if they also endorse a theory of social con-
tracts, natural law, or divine command. Watkins shows artfully that Kant 
avoided that regrettable mistake; his concept of law is univocal, with two 
proper species, one for theoretical reason, and another for practical. In 
Watkins’ memorable phrase, a Kantian law is a “a necessary rule that is the 
result of legislation” by the proper spontaneous authority (14). Such laws 
can bind rational agents; or they can determine objects—all without equiv-




We must commend Watkins on another count. His book gives the lion’s 
share to the laws of mechanics within Kant’s broader picture.  
 That is as it should be. Let’s start from a crucial fact too often ig-
nored. The real revolutionary aspect of early modern science was the cre-
ation of mechanics qua science of motion based on laws. The law of inertia, 
 
 
primarily, and a few laws governing deviations from inertial states. Every 
philosopher of note then spent significant time and energy reflecting on the 
laws of mechanics; consider a list, far from complete: Descartes, Hobbes, 
Leibniz, Malebranche, Locke, Wolff, du Châtelet, Maupertuis, d’Alembert, 
Boscovich, and Euler. Kant did too—he spent nearly half a century trying 
to make philosophical sense of the laws of mechanics. Disappointingly, 
however, few exegeses take this key fact seriously. Kant on Laws is the great 
exception, as is Michael Friedman’s recent work on the topic. In particular, 
Watkins was the first to pay close attention to the content, justification, and 
evolving context of Kant’s mechanical laws. That early sensitivity to this 
elusive problem paid off handsomely for Watkins. It enabled him to cast 
light on some passages that had resisted elucidation for centuries. And, it 
bore fruit well beyond those passages—his exegesis opened a new vista 
onto broad stretches of post-Leibnizian metaphysics, epistemology, and 
philosophy of science.4   
 For us followers, his scholarship on the problem is not just an ex-
emplum, it also sets a new standard. Specifically, future exegeses aiming to 
make sense of lawhood in Kant should clear two benchmarks. First, they 
must make the laws of mechanics into the centerpiece of any new interpre-
tation of Kant on laws in general. Second, they must make those laws into 
the Probierstein of the construal. Namely, exegetes should test the adequacy 
of their account of laws generaliter by showing it makes good sense of his 
laws of mechanics: because Kant himself thought they were the crucial test 
case for any philosophy of laws.5  
 From this vantage point, a whole family of interpretations falls 
short. They start with the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic; reach 
for some variant of the Mill-Ramsey-Lewis view of laws qua privileged 
sentences in some best-system of sorts; then return to the Appendix, to 
show that a best-system account of lawhood can handle those few pages in 
the Critique, plus a few paragraphs that some undergraduates wrote down 
                                                
4 Disclosure: I too have benefitted from his insights, in my work on Kant’s natural philos-
ophy, especially on his theory of motion and interactions.  
5 In the last two decades, the overarching constraint on interpreting Kant’s natural philos-
ophy has been Contextualism: his doctrines must be read and weighed against the back-
drop of the science of his age: its foundational agenda, explanatory resources, and repre-
sentational frameworks.  
 
 
in Kant’s classroom. In the process, these readings bypass the laws of me-
chanics entirely. But, that goes against history, Kant’s philosophical biog-
raphy, and the spirit of his reflections on law. As I said, Watkins does not 






I end with two critical notes. Really, they are invitations to elucidate, not 
objections—the book is unobjectionable. I think we should welcome fur-
ther light on two aspects of laws in MAN: the evidence for them; and the 
exact role of natures in his account of those laws. Our picture of these as-
pects is not yet clear and sharp enough for us to say how well Kant did.   
 In regard to laws of nature, the early moderns were in a sui generis  
predicament. No kind of science before Descartes had made room for the 
concept that nature is subject to laws; and they had rejected Aristotelian-
Scholastic epistemology. So, to them the tradition was of no help in regard 
to our knowledge of laws. In consequence, from the 1640s onward we see 
a broad array of views emerge on the epistemology of laws of nature. One 
view had it that, for fundamental laws, the evidence is metaphysical facts 
about substance (extension) and about God’s creative action (immutabil-
ity). On another view, laws are highly probable statements abducted from 
some optimality constraint on God’s activity. Yet another had it that laws 
are confirmed by reductio. A fourth one took them to be a posteriori 
knowledge “deduced from phenomena,” generalized by induction, and fur-
ther confirmed by successful predictions. This broad array of early modern 
positions should give us reason to ask, what was Kant’s view on the episte-
mology of laws? After all, he is justly famous for his epistemology-first ap-
proach to questions in theoretical philosophy. So far, this question remains 
sorely under-explored. Most of the relevant literature really amounts to 
 
 
philosophical analyses of lawhood in Kant.6 Watkins’ book too—and a 
splendid contribution it makes to that project—but it does more. To his 
credit, he had the courage and insight to ask: how does Kant think we know 
a judgment to be a law of nature? In this key respect he again broke new 
ground, and I will focus on just this aspect, below. In particular, on Kant’s 
evidence for the laws of MAN.  
 Evidence.  Those laws must count as a priori truths.7 Question: 
what is Kant’s warrant for them? His epistemology allows just three species 
of inference to such knowledge: analytic judgment, construction in pure 
intuition, and transcendental argument. The first two kinds fail the test (for 
various reasons), so only transcendental argument is left standing.8 Inci-
dentally, that yields a short argument for Watkins’ own view in the book. 
As he argues in Chapter 4, MAN’s structure is that of a transcendental ar-
gument. I just gave another reason to think that he is right.  
 Still, a good interpretation must balance judiciously two kinds of 
interests, hermeneutic and philosophical. So, we might ask how Watkins’ 
fares on both. Take exegetic considerations first. If Kant’s reasoning in 
MAN is indeed a set of transcendental arguments, he was oddly reluctant 
to use the proper terminology. Confoundingly, he called his warrant for the 
laws Beweise, and announced that he would imitate the “mathematical 
method.” But, his philosophy says that mathematics does not use transcen-
dental arguments to establish its claims. So, unless by ‘mathematical 
method’ Kant just meant a species of typographic layout on the page, it 
seems that transcendental argument is not the only pattern of reasoning in 
                                                
6 In modern terms, they analyze what makes a sentence nomic, or lawlike; and they ex-
amine the metaphysics of those law-makers. A modern epitome is M. LANGE, Laws and 
lawmakers, Oxford University Press, 2009.  
7 Note: I am not analyzing here the various senses of Kantian a priority. I am just giving a 
descriptive account of the forms of inference that lead from evidence to a priori claims, in 
his doctrine. Kant’s use of ‘a priori’ is notoriously equivocal—he applies it both to seman-
tic representations and to knowledge claims. My interest here is in the latter.   
8 In a forthcoming study, Kant’s Natural Philosophy, I explain in detail why no inference 
in MAN counts as construction in pure intuition, notwithstanding Kant’s occasional and 
mystifying talk of construction there. Second, Watkins might not count analytic judgments 
as a type of knowledge at all; cf. M. WILLASCHEK and E. WATKINS, Kant on cognition and 
knowledge, “Synthese,” 197, 2020, pp. 3195–3213.  
 
 
MAN after all. Should we dismiss as mere marketing his talk of giving 
proofs by imitating mathematics?  
 Natures.  Now take philosophical concerns. Many recent takes on 
lawhood in Kant rely on natures—the natures of things. Watkins does too, 
in regard to many laws, though not all: “some laws of nature will be based 
on the specific natures that objects in our world have.… The natures that 
underlie empirical laws include the natures of the relevant empirical ob-
jects” (34, 36). This vocabulary certainly echoes key themes of late Scho-
lastic and early modern metaphysics, and so it is contextually respectable. 
However, I would like to ask for clarification on it; here’s why.  
 In regard to laws, appeal to natures is deeply confounding, and we 
should get clear on what it really does for Kant, because natures can play 
three roles. Exegetes say that natures ground laws, but talk of grounding is 
equivocal, and when we disambiguate it, we discover that some grounding 
is beside the point. Suppose that G is a law, and N is the nature of the things 
governed by that law. Then ‘grounding’ is shorthand for three ideas. (1) 
ontological: the fact asserted by G depends for its existence on N. Things 
would not instantiate G-like behavior unless N was their nature. (2) ex-
planatory: N explains why law G obtains. Among the explanantia for G are 
facts about nature N. (3) evidential: N is a premise in the inference that law 
G is true. The evidence for G’s truth includes facts about the nature N.9 At 
this point, two notes are in order.  
 I wish to emphasize (very strongly) that these are fundamentally 
distinct ideas and concerns. Explanation yields understanding, whereas ev-
idence confirms the truth of a sentence. Evidence always confirms through 
argument—some inferential structure that channels truth from the justify-
                                                
9 A helpful catalogs and explication of the various notions of ground that Kant taught to 
his students is N. STANG, A guide to ground in Kant’s Lectures on Metaphysics, in FUGATE, 
Critical Guide, pp. 74-101. Apparently, Kant also admitted a fourth species of ground, viz. 
efficient causation. That species is out of place in regard to natures’ relevance to laws. 
Incidentally, I diverge from Stang somewhat. He credits Kant with a notion, “epistemic 
grounds,” that is sound but too broad for my aims here—it covers all reasons to believe a 
sentence. I prefer a narrower notion, namely, “evidential grounds.” I am interested here 
in elucidating the structure and specific content of the evidential reasoning that takes us 
from such grounds to laws of nature (as their consequences).     
 
 
ing facts to the sentence to be confirmed—but not all explanations are ar-
guments; some are descriptions.10 Finally, ontological dependence is or-
thogonal to epistemic input: it has no bearing on justification.  
 And, I think we need caution and stoicism around the issue of how 
natures explain laws. For one, Kant did not have a theory of scientific ex-
planation. Before Hempel nobody had one, of course, so we cannot blame 
Kant on this count. Still, the fact remains that we cannot elucidate the ex-
planation of laws from natures in Kant’s own terms. For another, modern 
analytic tools won’t help either. Of the five major theories of scientific ex-
planation we have, only two make room for the explanation of laws.11 How-
ever, both theories claim that laws are explained by other laws. Not by na-
tures. Current philosophy of science thus cannot shed light on the issue.  
 Some seem to think Kant’s explanation of laws is philosophical, not 
scientific. Then we need even more caution, I suggest—on methodological 
grounds. First, neither Kant nor us moderns have a theory of philosophical 
explanation.12 Specifically, we have as yet no settled answers to the ques-
tion, what is their structure, if any? Are they deductive arguments? If so, 
                                                
10 In deductive reasoning, the truth channel is (total) entailment, and the channeling is 
lossless—the conclusion is just as true as the evidence that entails it, no less. Inductive 
reasoning channels it imperfectly, via partial entailment: truth is transmitted only to the 
extent given by the conclusion’s degree of confirmation. As to scientific explanations, 
some are deductive arguments (with some law of nature as a premise sine qua non). But, 
many others—e.g., causal explanations—are not arguments. They are descriptions of 
causal processes; or listings of links in a causal chain that ends with the explanandum. For 
further details, see W. SALMON, Four Decades of  Scientific Explanation, University of 
Pittsburgh Press, 2006.   
11 In the deductive-nomological account, we explain a law by making it the conclusion of 
a deductive inference with one or more (higher-level) laws as indispensable premises. In 
the Friedman-Kitcher unificatory account, we explain it by subsuming it as a local version 
under a broader, more general law that integrates several narrower theories of limited 
scope; cf. SALMON, Scientific Explanation. The other three theories of scientific explana-
tion (the pragmatic, the statistical-relevance, and the causal-mechanical account) do not 
have explicit views about the explanation of laws. They aim primarily to vindicate the 
practice of explaining events. Explaining laws is a bonus feature that only some theories 
have.   
12 This is in sore contrast to the situation in philosophy of science, whose five theories of 
explanation have by now received sharp, exact formulations.  
 
 
what are the constraints on acceptable premises? Are they abductive infer-
ences? If so, what optimality criteria makes them inferences to the best ex-
planation? Are they just descriptions? The latter seems to be the implication 
of some recent work on laws in Kant.13 Second, it is unclear what these 
explanations target—which aspect of a law they mean to account for. The 
studies I’ve seen so far do not seem to agree on the explanandum. Is it the 
law’s obtaining, or being the case? Its truth? Its necessity? Its lawhood, or 
nomic status? I’m not sure that I see any agreement on this point. Third, 
we have no clear account of when consensus (on a philosophical explana-
tion) has been reached: no widely agreed criteria for who bears the burden 
of explanation, when that burden has been discharged or shifted, and which 
explanations are final.14 These matters are important per se, and become 
really crucial if one thinks that philosophical explanations are abductive—
that they count as inferences to the best explanation. In effect, then, we 
seem to lack both the historical and philosophical resources to elucidate the 
role of natures exactly. My worry is that all we exegetes can afford to say is, 
“natures explain laws,” and leave it at that. This has repercussions for the 
broader picture; see below.  
 Determining grounds.  I think that Kant and Laws made room 
for a fourth view on natures’ relation to laws: namely, thing-natures are 
determining grounds of the relevant laws. More exactly, suppose L is a law 
                                                
13 Some construe Kant’s explanations as instances of the sentence type “___in virtue 
of___,” where the former blank takes a law (qua explanandum), and the latter some fact 
about a relevant thing-nature (qua explanans). Cf. J. MESSINA, Kant’s necessitation ac-
count of  laws and the nature of  natures, in Kant and the Laws of  Nature, eds. M. Massimi 
& A. Breitenbach, Cambridge University Press, 2017, pp. 131-49; J. KREINES endorses 
that picture as well, in Kant on the laws of  nature: restrictive inflationism and its philosoph-
ical advantages, “The Monist” 100, 2017, pp. 326-341. So, a philosophical explanation 
amounts to asserting a relation of ontological dependence between two relata. Presumably, 
understanding—which any explanation must yield—follows the arrow of dependence. I 
don’t know why they thought that. Without a theory of philosophical explanation, I cannot 
see why ontological dependence alone is allegedly explanatory; or is better than alternative 
explanations.   
14 Consider the situation in analytic metaphysics, where deflationists and inflationists 
about truth-making do not agree on explanatory success and its burden. In response to 
deflationism, Lewis countered, “What sort of explanation is that?—No explanation at all, 
I agree.” Cf. D. LEWIS, Truth-making and difference-making, “Noûs” 35, 200, pp. 602–615: 
611. To be sure, deflationists disagree with his verdict. Similar failures of explanatory con-
sensus occur in theories of grounding and metametaphysics.  
 
 
asserting of some genus G of objects that b, c, and d are nomic behaviors; 
or that p, q, and r are nomic properties. Then prima facie it makes sense to 
ask, why are those properties and behaviors—as opposed to any others—
nomic? Why is L about them rather than any others? Watkins’ study implies 
that Kant would answer: the nature of G includes b, c, d, and also p, q, r. 
That explains why G’s basic laws are about those properties and behaviors, 
not just any others. (Alternatively, its nature includes the powers k, l, m, 
and the nomic behaviors that L asserts are effects of those causal powers.) 
In that sense, the nature of G is a determining ground of L: it explains why 
the law asserts those determinate behaviors, not just any behavior.  
 Fair enough. Note that Kant’s answer is not the only one on offer; 
there are others. So, we may ask whether his answer is the best explanation 
of G. However, I want to ask whether it is an adequate explanation. At this 
juncture, the two aspects above (confirmation and explanation) converge 
dangerously, and risk undermining each other; some hermeneutic skill is 
needed to keep them from sinking Kant’s project. Consider this explanation 
from determining grounds:  
N,  explanans:  The nature of genus G includes actions of type p and q.  
L,  explanandum:  It is a law that G-type objects exert p and q.  
Question: what is the evidence for the explanans? (It has to be true, or else 
the explanation is worthless.) How do we know that N is true? More gen-
erally, what confirms claims about the nature of an object class?  
 One might respond: the evidence for N is the very explanation 
above—its power to explain why L is nomic. Tempting as this sounds, it 
must be wrong. Explanations are not evidence, because explaining does not 
transmit truth; and because the explanation turns vacuous and uninforma-
tive if the explanans is not known independently, by a different route. Des-
cartes’ age already knew that; recall their favorite caricature:  
explanans:  Opium’s nature includes a power to cause sleep, virtus dormitiva.  
explanandum:  An intake of opium always induces sleep.  
Early modern philosophy began, inter alia, as a collective backlash against 
such ‘explanations’ from Aristotelian natures as determining grounds. We 
know well how vehement the 17th century was about their vacuity. But it 
wasn’t just them. Modern theorists too have warned against conflating ex-
planation and warrant. “We should distinguish,” they caution, between “a 
 
 
strong (good) explanation” and a “strong (good) reason for believing” that 
the explanandum is true.15 It seems that Kant would have agreed: he and 
“nearly every writer” in his time distinguished between “explanatory 
grounds” and “epistemic grounds.”16  
 In sum, explanation and evidence must be kept apart, if his account 
of laws is to be defensible. So, my final point is: the Kantian explanation of 
a law and the evidence for its determining ground must come from different 
sources, on pain of explanatory vacuity. I invite Watkins and everyone else 
to tell us what those sources are.  
 Conclusion.  If object-natures merely carry dependence or explain, 
then I think Watkins would assent to an interim conclusion:  
(A)  Natures are evidentially inert. They do not confirm the truth of laws.  
That leaves open the question of what counts as evidence for laws. Which 
may be good news for Watkins: it would give him the freedom to construe 
transcendental argument—his preferred view of evidential reasoning in 
MAN—in flexible ways that all other options preclude (see below). How-
ever, if facts about thing-natures are evidence, we face a different picture; 
the approach Watkins favors then comes to a crossroads:  
(B1)  Facts about thing-natures confirm basic laws—hence transcendental ar-
gument is not the only type of evidential inference, after all.  
(B2)  Or, by ‘transcendental argument in MAN,’ Watkins means a hybrid in-
ference that contains premises about thing-natures indispensably. 
In particular, those hybrid inferences would all be instances of one generic 
pattern of reasoning, as follows: 
P1.  Facts about the nature of some object-kind.  
P2.  Facts about the cognitive architecture of the epistemic agent coming to 
know the law at issue. Alternatively: claims about the objects of experience 
depending on, or being constituted by, the knower’s mental activity.  
P3.  Other facts, perhaps. (Which?) 
Conclusion:  Some basic law in MAN.  
                                                
15 For elaboration, see P. RAILTON, A deductive-nomological model of  probabilistic expla-
nation, in Philosophy of  Science, eds. M. Curd & J. Cover, Norton, 1998, pp. 746-65: 764.  
16 STANG, Guide to ground, p. 87. 
 
 
The second option, B2, would be a happy compromise between the main 
thrust of Watkins’ original account (of MAN’s argument structure) and the 
more recent, natures-first trends in scholarship. At the same time, it would 
lock him into a fixed view about the exact structure of Kant’s transcenden-
tal arguments outside the Critique. Specifically, it would press him to agree 
that a transcendental argument is just a deductive inference; what makes it 
transcendental is not a special structure—it is not some quartum quid 
alongside deduction, induction, and abduction—but the content of some 
key premises, viz. the P2 type of claim above.]  
 Granted, in talking about evidential reasoning I have been deliber-
ately vague. That sort of language really gets at two things: the sources of 
evidence, viz. the content of the premises that confirm a knowledge claim; 
and the logical structure, or pattern of inference, that channels truth from 
evidence to the conclusion it confirms thereby. And so, I conclude by re-
moving all ambiguity from my invitation. I hope Watkins and anyone plan-
ning to write on laws in Kant will try and give us clear answers to these 
questions: 
Q1.  What is the makeup of the arguments that confirm the laws of MAN? 
What do the key premises assert, and what makes them true? And, what is 
their logical genus—are they deductive, inductive or abductive?  
Q2.  What is the role of facts about object-natures in regard to Kant’s laws of 
nature? Are they explanantia that help us understand why the laws obtain? 
Are they evidence that the laws are true? Or are they just carriers of ontolog-
ical dependence? 
To be sure, none of these questions is remotely easy. And, there may not 
be enough words in Kant’s works to answer them with the exactness and 
rigor I demanded above. Still, if the questions are at all answerable, I trust 
that Watkins is among the very few who can shed any light on them. Kant 
on Laws is ample proof of that.  
 
